FORGETTING FREUD: THE COURTS’ FEAR OF THE SUBCONSCIOUS IN
DATE RAPE (AND OTHER) CASES
By Andrew E. Taslitz*
I. Introduction
Forensic linguistics - - the study of the inter-relationship between language and the law1 - has come into its maturity in the last few years.2 Progress has especially been made in
understanding the ways in which language use reproduces gender inequalities, notably in
sexual assault trials.3 Yet, while academic study in this area has blossomed, this field of
research has had little impact on the actual operation of date rape trials. This article in part
seeks to explain why. That explanation - - that courts fear and misunderstand the
subconscious mind - - it turns out, however, has broader significance for how courts
understand much of the substantive criminal law and the law of evidence. This article thus
uses judicial attitudes toward one category of social science evidence, forensic linguistics, as a
case study for examining a far more pervasive problem of criminal justice.
After this Introduction, Part II offers a whirlwind tour of the role of language in date rape
cases. There is little dispute among social scientists about two aspects of the connection
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between language use and jury verdicts in such cases. First, women are generally perceived
by jurors as using “women’s language” - - a language of hedged words, imprecise description,
and subservient tones - - whether or not they in fact use that supposed language. Yet speakers
of this language are generally perceived as less competent and credible than those speaking
“men’s language.”4 Second, jurors craft rape case narratives from the stories they hear in
novels, movies, and television programs, stories that often add to the impression that the
victim is either confused or lying. These two effects - - of gendered language use and
gendered narratives - - work primarily at the subconscious level, jointly leading even the most
“feminist” of jurors to disbelieve the victims of date rape.5
Numerous solutions to this problem of subconscious gendered linguistic bias have been
proposed, including expert testimony and jury instructions on the subject, victim testimony
uninterrupted by objections, and linguistic “intermediaries” to translate defense counsel
questions into less dominating forms without destroying the sting of truly truth-probing crossexamination. Yet this largely undisputed science, and the various proposed solutions, have
received nearly no attention from courts or legislatures. Why? Although this near-complete
inattention may be unusual, it turns out that law-making, law-interpreting, and law-applying
governmental actors tend to resist any legal insights that turn on understanding the
subconscious mind and its implications for legal reasoning. Judges in particular show such
resistance, with the important exception of cases in which the law expressly makes a
conception of the subconscious as dangerous and diseased legally relevant. This is true, for
example, of the insanity defense in criminal cases.6
The judicial reticence to wrestle with the subconscious, I argue, requires understanding
the difference between everyday or “folk” conceptions of the subconscious and the scientific
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conceptions. Part IIIA explores the folk understanding of the subconscious and its
consequences for the substantive criminal law and the law of evidence. The primary elements
of the folk subconscious, which also constitute the elements embraced by the law, are these:
(1) the conscious and subconscious minds are distinct entities, the former being rational, the
latter being diseased; (2) the interaction between the two is uni-directional, flowing from the
subconscious to the conscious but not vice-versa, and with the conscious unaware of, and
unable to resist, the influence of this flow; (3) the inaccessibility and inscrutability of the
subconscious mind means that only experts can access it or influence it, yet even their
interpretations of such a mysterious, ambiguous entity are highly suspect; and (4) even if we
could access and understand it, those might be unwise tasks because what we would uncover
would be both frightening and dangerous. Accordingly, the law should focus on what it can
understand and trust: the relatively rational, clear thinking of the conscious mind.7
The consequences of the law’s infusion with this flawed folk idea of the subconscious
mind are unfortunate. Because the subconscious is seen as dangerous to our “true,” conscious
self, robbing it of its rational autonomy - - the free will that makes us responsible for what we
do - - we are not fully responsible for crimes caused by our subconscious. Doctrines like the
insanity defense, diminished capacity, and imperfect self-defense in part reflect this insight.8
Correspondingly, however, it makes no sense to permit the prosecution to prove
subconscious mental states as part of its case-in-chief because this “lower” mind can only
help to relieve, not to impose, criminal responsibility. Even for the defense, arguments rooted
in a vision of the subconscious as only partially diseased, such as the “abuse excuses,” often
do not fare well, particularly when they suggest that society, not merely the accused, bears
some responsibility for the defendant’s actions. Similarly, outside the extremes of the
7
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insanity and cognate defenses, experts about the subconscious human mind, from therapists to
experimental psychologists, are distrusted.9
Relatedly, judges generally privilege the conscious and the concrete. For example, judges
deny challenges to jurors for cause when circumstances suggest that the jurors likely harbor a
subconscious bias against the accused, so long as the potential jurors consciously conclude,
and thus publicly declare, that they can be fair.10 Judges likewise fear efforts to build
subconscious empathy between jurors and defendants or witnesses, such as by “raceswitching” instructions that ask parties to get in touch with their often unacknowledged racial
biases by imagining the crime’s occurring with the races of the victim and the accused
reversed. Judges also display conflicting attitudes toward the role of narrative, recognizing
that lawyers must consciously craft good tales but resisting efforts to cure the subconscious
effects of prevailing cultural narratives. Furthermore, judges place more faith in the
conscious expressions of trial witness’s thoughts - - such as with eyewitness identifications - than in experts’ analyses of subconscious processes, such as those rendering many eyewitness
identifications suspect.11
Part IIIB contrasts the dominant folk vision of the subconscious with its scientific twin.
Empirical data portrays the scientific subconscious as more a spectrum than a dichotomy.
There are a range of mental states varying in the degree to which they approach, or are
accessible to, conscious reasoning. Furthermore, the more subconscious layers of thoughts
and feelings are better understood as stemming from multiple systems rather than a single
9
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“subconscious mind.” These multiple systems operate quickly, automatically, and shortsightedly, focusing on problems and dangers in the here-and-now.12
The conscious mind, by contrast, is a relatively more unitary entity, operating more
slowly, and better able to plan for the future. Moreover, the conscious-subconscious
relationship is bi-directional, each capable of influencing the other. Much conscious thought
begins in the subconscious, though we are unaware of these roots, and though the conscious
can often veto subconscious decisions before they become actions. Correspondingly, the
ability of the conscious mind to plan means that we can be educated to make some
subconscious operations - - primarily feelings and attitudes, as opposed to cognitions - accessible to the conscious mind. Introspection can be a self-deluding means toward this
goal, but paying close attention to how others perceive our behavior can often provide better
clues to what our subconscious is doing.13
Perhaps even more importantly, our consciousness can alter our subconsciousness even
when the former has no idea what the latter is doing. Notably, consciously collecting more
information relevant to a decision can also educate the subconscious mind. Thus, if a man on
a date decides to go slow, getting to know his female partner better over time, rather than
acting on his initial belief that she is interested in intercourse, his subconscious is more likely
to trigger “gut feelings” of discomfort where his belief may be in error; he is therefore less
likely to press for sex when consent may be lacking.14
The subconscious also learns from our behavior, so if we behave as the man we want to
be, such as acting like a man who truly cares about the wishes of his hoped-for sexual partner,
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we become that man. The subconscious is more rigid in its ways than is the conscious, thus
slower to change, but change it can and will.15
The bottom line is that conscious thoughts cannot be fully understood or divorced from
subconscious ones, and the latter can be perfectly healthy and can be subject to the long-term
control of the former. It therefore often makes little sense to see the subconscious as
depriving us of free will or as being beyond the probings, responsibility assessments, and
behavioral and character-changing incentives of the criminal law.16
Part IV explores the implications for the substantive and evidentiary criminal law of
replacing the folk theory of the subconscious with the scientific one. One such implication is
- - subject to a number of guarantees of reliability - - occasionally enhancing judicial
receptivity to psychologists’ “informed speculations” about the effect of a particular accused’s
subconscious mind on his conscious thoughts and behavior. Yet the case-specific proof
problems concerning the subconscious mind’s content that are exaggeratedly presupposed by
the folk conception are nevertheless real. One way around this problem is to use knowledge
of the subconscious mind to craft objectivemental state elements as part of the substantive
crime’s definition.17
For example, much data suggests that many date rapists engage in self-deception about
their victim’s consent, consciously believing in it but subconsciously knowing otherwise. Yet
they engage in cognitive strategies to block their conscious minds from learning the truth. A
mens rea requirement that asks the jury to judge whether a non-self-deceiving male would
have been aware of the woman’s non-consent recognizes individual moral culpability for
subconscious self-deceptive strategies but without judging whether this particular offender
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engaged in such self-deception. Although such a substantive criminal law strategy might
mean punishing some small subset of men who in fact believed both consciouslyand
subconsciously that the victim consented, Part IVA explains why this approach is nevertheless
just, for it is most consistent with the presupposition of individual and societal deliberative
capacities that is essential to the legitimacy of the criminal law in a democratic republic of
free and equal citizens. Part IVA further defends the validity of this democratic vision in the
face of the theory of “memes,” which posits that ideas are viruses that overtake our minds
without our fully conscious choice, thus supposedly compromising our free will.18
Part IVB returns to the evidentiary implications of the scientific subconscious, first
explaining why generalizations about on-average subconscious processes can have relevance
in individual cases. Illustratively, if most people would give undue weight to a character
trait’s power as a predictor of an accused’s actions at a particular time, it is a fair bet that at
least some jurors will indeed suffer from this subconscious bias, arguably thereby justifying
excluding character evidence at trial. Part IVB also examines the problem of contextualization
versus de-contextualization, that is, that jurors sometimes bring pre-existing knowledge about
context into the jury room when the law requires them to ignore it, or the jurors either lack or
ignore knowledge of relevant context when the law demands that it be paid attention. Expert
testimony and other evidentiary techniques may help to bring the contextualization/decontextualization balance to the equilibrium that the law requires. Where that balance
precisely should be is, of course, a normative question, and Part IVB offers some guidelines
to illustrate the flavor of how these normative judgments can be made. Once again, Part IVB
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finds helpful normative guidance in the theory of proper institutional design in a democratic
republic.19
Part V recaps the primary conclusions of this article, offering both narrow and broad
ruminations about how the scientific vision of the subconscious should alter both legal
practice and the content of the substantive and evidentiary criminal law. Narrowly, Part V
explains how better use can be made of forensic linguistics experts in date rape trials and in
law reform. Broadly, Part V offers speculations concerning how the scientific subconscious
might have wider application to criminal justice well beyond the specific problem of date
rape, suggesting the need for further study and research in these areas. My hope is thus that
this article will start a conversation about how to replace the ill-informed folk visions
dominating the criminal law with the more realistic and normatively desirable scientific
ones.20
II. A Whirlwind Tour of Forensic Linguistics in Date Rape Cases
A. “Women’s Language”
Those who study language and the law have revealed how the law-in-action can
diverge from the law-as-ideal. Although law on the books expresses a commitment to gender
equality, the ways in which language is used at trial and in other legal institutions can promote
the very opposite result.21 The strand of law and language research of most relevance to
sexual assault trials, therefore, is one that explains the otherwise little-noticed mechanisms by
which language usage affects social power. Two of the leaders in this field, Professors John

19

See infra text accompanying notes 215 - 57. On the justifications for the character evidence bar and its
exceptions, see STEVEN FRIEDLAND, ET. AL., EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 90 - 98 (2d ed. 2004). For an
analysis of the role of context in expert testimony, see generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Abuse Excuses and the Logic
and Politics of Expert Relevance, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1998).
20
See infra text accompanying notes 259 - 72.
21
See, e.g., ANDREW TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 1-11 (1999) [hereinafter TASLITZ,
RAPE AND CULTURE].

8

M. Conley and William O’ Barr, in a recent text summarizing the state of research in this
area, explained:
The particular body of work that is our focus here introduces
another important variable into the law-language equation: power.
This research looks at the law’s language in order to understand
the law’s power. Its premise is that power is not a distant
abstraction but rather an everyday reality. For most people, the
law’s power manifests itself less in Supreme Court decisions and
legislative pronouncements than in the details of legal practice, in
the thousands of mini-dramas reenacted every day in lawyers’
offices, police stations, and courthouses around the country. The
dominant element in almost every one of these mini-dramas is
language. To the extent that power is realized, exercised, abused,
or challenged in such events, the means are primarily linguistic.22

In sexual assault trials, the means by which gendered power is exercised are primarily twofold. First, perceived micro-linguistic differences in speaker style and access to the floor alter
speaker credibility.23 For example, researchers have posited the existence of a “women’s
language,” a way of speaking that is on-average more characteristic of women than men.24
Such a language includes
Such stylistic features as hedge words (kind of, sort of), polite
forms (sir), tag questions appended to declarative statements (The
meeting’s at three, isn’t it?), exaggerated imprecision about
quantities (It was about a mile, but I’m not very good at distances),
and a rising, inquisitive intonation in normally declarative contexts
(six-thirty?) in response to a question about when dinner will be
ready)….25
What is most important here is this: whether or not a woman speaks “women’s language,”
she will generally be perceived as doing so by jurors at a trial.26 This is so because our
stereotypes or “folk linguistic” beliefs about how women speak closely track the descriptions
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of women’s language.27 Stereotypes lead us to ignore contrary evidence while attending to
confirming evidence. Furthermore, these biases are magnified by the “fundamental attribution
error,” our tendency to attribute behavior more to personality than context.28 Consequently,
when we see many women in low-status roles speaking politely, we attribute that behavior to
women’s essential nature rather than to their social role. The resulting linguistic stereotypes
resist change, as they have in American culture for more than twenty years.29
One effect of perceiving women’s language where it does not exist and of viewing it as
typical female behavior is the self-fulfilling prophecy. Women learn that they will be ignored
or disliked if they violate stereotypical norms, so they try not to deviate too much from those
norms.30
Although other factors, such as race, age, and class, can reduce the effects of stereotypes,
the effects are greatest where gender is most salient. But gender is most salient in initial
encounters or where women are in the minority.31 Our gendered cognitive biases lessen as we
get to know individuals better. Interestingly, female crime victims at trials face precisely
those initial encounters (between victim and jurors) in which women are often in the minority.
Moreover, the very nature of the crime of rape suggests that gender will be salient.32
The effect of the real or imagined use of women’s language can be devastating to a
woman’s credibility. Anyone using women’s language is evaluated as more caring but less
credible, competent, and intelligent.33 These evaluations are magnified when women, rather
than men, are the speakers. Furthermore, the indirectness characteristic of women’s language
27
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may be seen as insecurity, apology as weakness.34 Additionally, women’s language speakers’
use of shorter, less aggressive responses in public settings command less attention. Similarly,
their giving reasons for their suggestions and arguing from their personal experience rather
than from abstract principle, two “feminine” strategies, are relatively unpersuasive to men.35
These effects are much larger in laboratory settings than in studies involving naturally
occurring speech, but even modest effects can be decisive in criminal cases.36 There, defense
victory requires only “reasonable doubt.”37
Yet women face a double bind if they violate stereotypical speech norms.38 Most men
simply do not like aggressive women.39 “There is a sense in which every woman is seen as a
receptionist - - available to give information and help, perennially interruptible.”40 Women
who violate stereotypes may seem unlikable or unworthy to many men. Furthermore, men
resist receiving information from those, like women, whom men perceive as of lower status
because being lecturer rather than listener is the superior (i.e., men’s) role.41
In sum, women may be perceived as using women’s language when they are not, a
perception marking them as stupid, incompetent, and incredible. Yet too masculine a style
means that they will be disliked or ignored. For women to be seen as credible, they must walk
a fine line between opposed stereotypes.
B. Gendered Narratives
The second way in which trial language affects social power is in the creation of
narrative. Jurors reason toward a verdict by constructing a narrative of what happened in the
34
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real world.42 This narrative consists not only of deciding who physically did what to whom
but with what mental state, how, and why.43 The narrative includes an understanding of the
character of each of the players and a moral assessment of their actions, beliefs, and
intentions.44 But these tales are not crafted out of whole cloth. Rather, jurors draw on themes
learned from relevant tales in the broader society and on pre-existing understandings of what
constitutes a “good,” coherent, sensible tale.45 The themes learned from nursery stories,
novels, television series, movies, and various news media about proper gendered behavior
generally, and of the nature of rape specifically, thus play a central role in the tale that jurors
in a sexual assault trial craft to make sense of the case before them.46
In creating rape stories, jurors are affected by governing ideologies - - a structural
framework that governs their world. Ideology is often embodied in metaphors - - ways of
understanding one aspect of the world in terms of another.47 “Sex as achievement” is, for
example, one metaphor by which many men structure their understanding of women.48
Related metaphors are of sex as a hunt (“I’m going out to get a piece of ass tonight”), a game
(“scoring” or “striking out”), war (getting “shot down” and “hitting on women”), triumph
through inflicting sexual pleasure (“I got her so hot she could hardly stand it!”), a commodity
(“why should a man rape if he can get it for free?”), and theft (“He’s robbing the cradle”).49
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And women are animals (“chick,” “bitch,” “beaver”), objects (“a cute thing,” “a little bit of
that”), and genitals (“she’s a cunt.”).50
If pleasure can be “inflicted,” then there is no harm, even from force, and thus no rape.
Moreover, animals, objects, and commodities cannot grant or withhold consent, so a woman
cannot generally object to force, and thus, again, no rape. Furthermore, these metaphors,
which relate to sex as achievement and women as commodities, lead men to view sex as
giving them status over women and in the eyes of other men, to view women as objects of
hostility, animals to be hunted, or things to be bought; to seek control, which by definition is
needed to possess a commodity; and to seek dominance as necessary to win a war, a hunt, or a
game.51 Some measure of physical or psychological violence is by definition part of sex under
these controlling metaphors. The metaphors thus embody patriarchal ideology - - a set of
lenses for viewing the world through the assumption of male dominance.52 Metaphors can be
triggered by things as subtle as the choice of words at trial (e.g., a “bar” seems a sleazy place
for a woman to be, and a “club” invokes images of “clubbing” - - lascivious dancing in lowcut dresses with many men in a quest for fleeting, impersonal sexual satisfaction).53 The
ideology embodied in metaphors can act as “epistemological filters” affecting what evidence
jurors receive, what weight and meaning they give to it.54
Likewise, the cultural themes at work in a rape case are not always obvious ones. Fairy
tales like The Little Mermaid - - in which a mermaid becomes muteas the price for be coming
human to win the man she loves, failing at first to compete with an even more beautiful
woman, then finding success when she regains her song - - teach that women are most
50
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attractive when silent or because of the beauty of their voices rather than the content of their
character or the expression of their deepest needs.55 The evil character in the tale is the ugly
Sea Witch, who, unlike the mermaid, aggressively expresses her needs and seeks to fulfill
them. Aggressive women, who express their needs, especially about sexuality, become in
jurors’ minds hideous, unworthy “sea witches” at a rape trial, though jurors may be unaware
of the connection they are making between the many cultural tales like The Little Mermaid
and the alleged rape victim before them. Women, as well as men, fall prey to these sorts of
cognitive processes. Indeed, even the most well-meaning, “feminist” jurors may find that they
have a reasonable doubt about the specific rape case before them if the tale told fits cultural
stories about “sluttish women,” an observation supported by ample empirical evidence.56
C. Judicial and Legislative Inaction: A Working Hypothesis
These are but a few short illustrations of how perceived linguistic style, linguistic
access opportunities, and narrative thinking can combine to bias rape trial jurors against a
clear analysis of the evidence before them and against giving appropriate weight to the alleged
female victim’s version of reality. Far greater, sometimes book-length examinations of these
phenomena have been done elsewhere.57 There is ample reason to believe that the failure to
address these linguistic means of gendered domination at rape trials helps to explain why prior
rape law reforms, such as rape shield statutes (often prohibiting admitting evidence of a
woman’s prior sex life or sexual predisposition), cessation of the old requirement of
corroboration of the woman’s testimony, and modest re-definitions of the crime itself have
done little to improve rape reporting and conviction rates or to re-shape sexist public

55

See THE LITTLE MERMAID (Disney 1990); Gwyneth Cravens, Past Present, THE NATION, May 11, 1992, at
638, 638-40 (comparing original Hans Christian Anderson tale with the Disney one).
56
See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 42, at 394-440, 465-71.
57
See e.g., MATOESIAN, REPRODUCING RAPE, supra note 54; MATOESIAN, LAW AND IDENTITY. supra note 3.

14

understandings of rape and of proper gendered behavior.58 Numerous suggestions have been
made for curing the linguistic infections thatail the justice system, including “intermediary”
questioners to “translate” defense counsel’s questions into less misleading and oppressive
forms at trial; permitting alleged victims wider leeway to give longer, fuller responses to
lawyers’ questions; and calling empathic experts to educate jurors about why they resist giving
fair consideration to rape victims’ tales - - explaining the cognitive processes at work, the
power of cultural rape narratives, and why jurors disbelieve witnesses with “feminine”
linguistic styles.59 Yet none of these and other linguistic proposals have yet received serious
consideration by legal decisonmakers.
There are a number of obvious explanations for this judicial and legislative reticence to
change. One might be a growing cultural backlash against feminism generally.60 Another
might be perceived (though arguably surmountable) constitutional obstacles to some of the
proposed changes.61 Still another obstacle might be the experimental nature of many of those
proposals combined with a fear of such techniques’ unknown psychological impact causing
the conviction of increasing numbers of entirely innocent men.62 All these are plausible
explanations for the resistance to change. But in this article I want to explore a hitherto
largely ignored contributing factor: the law’s general fear of poking around in the
subconscious mind.63
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62
WARREN FARRELL, THE MYTH OF MALE POWER (1993) (alleging that 60% of rape allegations are false).
63
There is a complex and tedious debate about the meanings of the terms “subconscious” and “unconscious,”
both between philosophers’ and natural scientists’ usages of these terms and among individual thinkers within
these two groups. Again, I do not believe that clarity or precision require my recounting or taking sides in this
debate. The “folk” notions of the mind that govern the law in operation at modern criminal trials (notions to be
discussed shortly) treat anything less than fully conscious, self-aware mental states as usually irrelevant to legal
culpability, the exceptions being unusual cases in which extreme disorders of the less-than-fully-conscious mind
sicken the conscious mind, thus reducing or eliminating individual culpability. But science and philosophy both
59
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The impact of linguistic styles and narrative reasoning processes on jury deliberations and
verdicts takes place largely in the subconscious. Jurors are not aware that the reason that they
disbelieve a rape victim may be their perception of the victim’sperceived use of “women’s
language,” her willingness to submit to “turn domination” by defense attorneys (leading to
brief, deferential responses by alleged victims to counsel’s questions at trial), and the
resonance of defense arguments with cultural rape narratives. These processes largely take
place in the witness’s subconscious.64 Yet the criminal justice system’s willingness to explore
the role of the subconscious is a limited one. Although many of Sigmund Freud’s theories
have now been discredited, his energetic preaching of the importance of a realm of thought
outside of conscious awareness - - what he called the “unconscious” and I call the
“subconscious” - - has much to commend it. At the same time, his vision of the subterranean
mind as a dark, dank recess of horror and irrationality distorts the true role of the subconscious
in moral decisonmaking. The courts too often forget those aspects of Freud’s theories that
make sense (the real existence of less-than-conscious thought) and remember those that do not
(the subconscious as generally irrational).65 Understanding this judicial confusion requires

reveal a spectrum of interactive degrees of consciousness that belies any simple dichotomy between the
conscious and other mental states and undermines the idea that portions of the spectrum below full
consciousness should generally be irrelevant to the law. The conclusions that I reach remain the same, though
perhaps with differing degrees of strength, wherever we are on the less-than-fully conscious portion of the
spectrum and would be unaltered by a more fine-grained and time-consuming elaboration of terminology.
Moreover, I chose the term “sub,” rather than “un” conscious because some of the mental states to which I refer
are, metaphorically speaking, “submerged” just below the surface of conscious thought and can, in theory,
eventually be brought into conscious awareness; others can fairly readily be influenced by the conscious mind,
even if these lightly submerged thoughts never do break through to the surface; and others are forever beyond
conscious access and perhaps beyond full conscious control but nevertheless remain below consciousness and
thus still “sub” conscious. The term “unconscious,” so often preferred by many writers, seems too much to
connote solely the last category and likely fosters popular images among lay people of what happens in the mind
of someone who is “knocked out,” in a coma, or, at best, asleep. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Wilfully
Blinded: On Date Rape and Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 381 (2005) (summarizing the nature of
these various less-than-conscious mental states, though using the “unconscious” moniker to label their
connections) [hereinafter Taslitz, Willfully Blinded].
64
See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 42, at 402-33 (on the cognitive processes involved).
65
See FRANK TALLIS, HIDDEN MINDS: A HISTORY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS ix-xiii, 53-72. (2002)
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examining the differences between “folk” and scientific concepts of the subconscious mind, to
which I now turn.
III. Folk Versus Scientific Notions of the Subconscious Mind
The substantive criminal law and the law of evidence in criminal cases reflect what might
aptly be called “folk” or commonsense notions about the nature of the subconscious mind.66
Modern “scientific” motions of the subconscious mind - - by which I mean any empiricallyinformed concept, whether used by philosophers or by laboratory experimenters - - differ from
folk notions in important ways.
A. The Lawyers’ Folk Subconscious
1. Folk Subconsciousness and the Criminal Law
To lawyers, the conscious and subconscious minds are sharply distinct entities. The
existence of one does not depend on the existence of the other. Moreover, there are no shades
of gray: thoughts and feelings are either conscious or not, with no middle group.67
Furthermore, each entity is essentially unitary, that is, there is one conscious mind and one
subconscious one, even if either or both might contain a small number of sub-minds, perhaps
analogous to Freud’s tripartite notion of the mind as id (the passions), ego (the grownup and
66

Cf. DEBORAH CAMERON, FEMINISM & LINGUISTIC THEORY 44 (1992) (1985) (defining “folk linguistics”).
In not one of the criminal cases that I tried, or assisted in, as a prosecutor was the state’s focus on anything
other than the conscious thoughts of the accused. In a very small number of cases, primarily involving insanity
claims, the defense inquired into the subconscious mind of the offender as a ground for exculpating the accused.
Even in those cases, however, the question implicitly posed was whether subconscious processes rendered
conscious free will absent. The two realms of the conscious and the subconscious were otherwise usually neither
merged, interactive, nor subdivided. When trial judges did venture to opine about psychology, their comments
either reflected pop concepts of Freudian psychology or other images of the “folk subconscious” described here
and held among the lay population. Testimony about subconscious processes at work in the minds of those other
than the accused – such as jurors and witnesses -- occasionally fared better, though resistance still ran high.
Although resistance to this last category of testimony is increasingly weakening of late, primarily because of
rising evidence of the subconscious’s role in the expanding number of innocent persons wrongly convicted,
growing opposition to supposed “junk science” has retarded change.(See generally KENNETH FOSTER & PETER
HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS (MIT Press 1999).). Nothing
that I have read or heard from academics or other prosecutors in my seventeen years of teaching criminal law
and evidence law suggests any substantial change in this state of affairs. It is primarily the conscious mind
simpliciter – standing on its own -- that is the focus of the criminal law, and rare legal expeditions into the
subconscious view it as separate from, but preying upon, the otherwise healthy conscious mind, the subconscious
more as cancer than as part of the self.
67
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problem-solver), and superego (the conscience).68 There is communication between the
conscious and subconscious minds, but that communication is primarily uni-directional, that
is, from the subconscious to the conscious mind, though we may not be aware that, or how,
this is happening.
Novelist Paul Levinson, in The Consciousness Plague, uses a disease metaphor to capture
this sense of the distinctness, the otherness, of the conscious and subconscious minds vis-à-vis
each other.69 In Levinson’s novel, police investigation into mysterious cases of memory loss
reveals that a bacteria-like organism has lived in our brains from the dawn of our species and
may be responsible for our very consciousness. The memory loss arises when new antibiotics
cross the blood-brain barrier, killing the microbes that enable us to act with awareness.
Levinson has one character, a “cognitive historian,” explain:
All I’m saying is that there are lots of living and quasi-living things
running around inside us - - in symbiotic, parasitic, and probably
neutral relationships with us. And these relationships - - the symbiotic
ones, especially - - may well truly make us what we are as human
beings. And part of that, in view of the bacterial gift of gab, could
conceivably be helping our brains work, enabling us to think,
remember - - who knows?70
68

See TALLIS, supra note 65, at 53-72 (Freud’s tripartite notion of the mind).
Freud in fact viewed the id, ego, and superego, as “not simply different parts of the mind, but powers - - each
with a specific function.” Id. at 61. The id operated “unconsciously,” but, in Freud’s terminology, both the ego
and the superego had conscious, “preconscious,” and unconscious regions. Id. Freud’s unconscious is a
mysterious and frightening place:
exempt from mutual contradiction. It is a place where love and hate can comfortably
exist, side by side. Like a machine designed by Escher, its impossible gears are not
thwarted by logical inconsistencies. They smoothly work around stark juxtapositions and
polarities.
The unconscious is timeless. Events are not ordered chronologically in the
unconscious, nor are they altered by the passage of time. The recollections of early
childhood are as potent as the recollections of the previous day.
Finally, the unconscious is a “place” - - a location where external reality has been
replaced by what Freud has called “psychical reality.” It is a kind of psychoanalytic
cyberspace. An inner landscape where virtually anything can happen. It has its own
enigmatic truths. The psychological truths of fantasy and the dream world.
Id. at 68.
69
PAUL LEVINSON, THE CONSCIOUSNESS PLAGUE (2003).
70
Id. at 87.
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Levinson’s metaphor can be read as consistent with folk notions of the mind because it
emphasizes that the conscious and subconscious minds are seen as so different as literally to
be distinct forms of life (human, bacterial). On the other hand, Levinson’s image can also be
disturbing precisely because it unsettles some folk notions of mind. The plague may not
literally be our conscious mind, but it can be seen as mutually interacting with our physical
being to give birth to consciousness. Moreover, if it is true that an alien infection is what
makes us conscious, then our “real,” uninfected humanity lay in our subconsciousness. That
our humanity consists of the primitive subconscious mind’s symbiotic relationship with an
alien plague can thus also undermine the sense of the true separateness of our higher
(conscious) and lower (subconscious) selves. This simultaneous contrasting reading of
separateness and fusion are what so disturb the novel’s readers, as does the suspicion that the
lower, animalistic mind is our essential self.71
If we fear that the subconscious may be who we really are, it is because the official folk
wisdom of the law is just the opposite: that our conscious mind is our true self and the master
of our ship.72 It is our aware, conscious mind that gathers information and makes informed
choices - - that is the seat of the autonomy that makes us human. The contents of the
subconscious mind are, however, inaccessible to laypeople. Only experts - - therapists, social
71

Cf. V.S. RAMACHANDRAN & S. BLAKESLEE, PHANTOMS IN THE BRAIN: PROBING THE MYSTERIES OF THE
HUMAN MIND 152 (1998) (“[Y]our conscious mind is simply a façade and…you are completely unaware of
what really goes on in your brain.”).
Some neuroscientists, like Ramachandran and Blakeslee, go so far as to see the conscious mind as largely a
fiction. (See RAMACHANDRAN &BLAKESLEE, supra, at 152; cf. DANIEL WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS
WILL (2002) (arguing that conscious will is an illusion, but a necessary one that helps to serve as a guide to
understanding ourselves and to developing a sense of responsibility and morality by helping us to appreciate and
remember our authorship of the things our minds and bodies do). This approach is not helpful, however, for the
practical purposes of the legal attribution of responsibility and is contradicted by the work of other cognitive
theorists who conclude that the more versus the less conscious parts of our minds serve distinct adaptive
functions (See infra sources cited in Part IV) - - distinct but neither bright-line nor dichotomous nor independent.
(See infra Part IVA4).
72
Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2005) (listing as the subjective mental states upon which criminal liability
may be based only those involving conscious awareness).
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workers, perhaps the clergy - - can, with time, hard work, and our cooperation, gain access to
our animal self.73 Our true selves thus remain ignorant of, and thus unable to control, our
subconscious selves. On the other hand, our subconscious selves can influence our bodily
actions and conscious selves without the latter’s awareness.74 In effect, the subconscious crew
mutinies, taking command of the ship without the true captain’s ever knowing that he has lost
it.75 As psychologist Timothy Wilson puts it, “A standard analogy is that consciousness is the
President in the executive branch of the mind …if he or she is ignorant of what is occurring
out of sight (lacking in self-insight), then the agencies of the adaptive unconscious may start to
make decisions that are contrary to the wishes of the President.”76
Because conscious autonomy is the hallmark of a healthy personality, the folk vision is
that the influence of the subconscious on the conscious mind is an unhealthy one, subverting
the natural order of higher (the conscious) and lower (the subconscious) and of who should
rightly be in charge. The subconscious can thus rob us of the ability to make autonomous
choices - - the free will - - that makes us responsible for our actions.77 Correspondingly,
however, we are not responsible, or at least not fully so, for actions initiated or “caused by”
our subconscious mind. In the criminal law, therefore, the subconscious is presumptively
never the basis for full moral and legal responsibility but can compromise the conscious
73

Using Freud’s theory as the quintessential example, Professor Daniel Robinson made the point thus:
The Archimedean point from which the clinician can discover what is otherwise buried in
the recesses of the unconscious is reached by way of dream interpretation that, according
to Freud, is nothing less than the via reggia to all that is repressed. What is found in the
dream are symbols and codes, ambiguous and transitory enough to keep the dreamer
sleeping, if fitfully, but revealing enough for the skilled interpreter to unearth those
wishes which can find safe fulfillment only in the dream.

DANIEL ROBINSON, PRAISE AND BLAME: MORAL REALISM AND ITS APPLICATIONS (2002).
74
See id. at 154 (in Freudian theory, “What has been repressed and is no longer available to consciousness
continues to influence thought, but does so in ways beyond the cognitive powers of the thinker.”).
75
See id. at 154 (“The thoughts and actions arising from repressed material cannot be said to be acting on the
basis of a rational deliberation of means and ends.”).
76
TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS 46 (2002).
77
But cf. ROBINSON, supra note 73, at 154-59 (rejecting this logic).
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mind’s full responsibility by infecting the latter. Thus the subconscious enters into
discussions of criminal liability in the form of insanity defenses in which “mental diseases or
defects” rob us of our ability to tell right from wrong, or prevent us from forming the most
serious conscious mental states required to prove the most heinous crimes, or come in the
form of syndromes portraying their sufferers as aberrants who cannot see the world through
the eyes of the “normal.”78
Ill mental health may, therefore, also often stem from “repression,” moving unpleasant
conscious thoughts into the subconscious zone.79 Health consists of bringing that which has
been submerged into the darkness out before the light. The therapist’s task, through dream
interpretation, reading Rorschach inkblots, close observation, and guided therapeutic
questioning, is to relieve the ballast weighing down that which we will not face.80 When the
submerged knowledge surfaces, our autonomy returns, our health is restored.81 Overcoming
self-deception is thus a prerequisite for self-control, yet, until we achieve self-knowledge, we
cannot be held responsible for its absence, for the task is too hard to bear alone.82

78

See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed 2003) (insanity and diminished capacity);
Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young Men: Reflections of a Feminist
Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433 (1995) (syndromes).
79
TALLIS, supra note 65, at 13-62.
80
See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 44, at 30-44 (summarizing therapeutic techniques).
81
See TALLIS, supra note 65, at 63 (“[T]he psychoanalyst [must] win back parts of the mind that have
succumbed to the unconscious”).
82
Andrew Taslitz, Wilfully Blinded, supra note 63, at 395-441 (on reality of self-deception and the debate over
its moral implications). Professor Robinson, by contrast, questions whether self-deception is psychologically
possible, ROBINSON, supra note 73, at 175, but, if it is, finds the situations where self-knowledge and control are
ultimately beyond conscious influence to be quite rare and, even then, a debatable basis for freeing one’s self
from moral responsibility. See id. at 175-76. He finds no basis for dispute, however, where self-knowledge or
control is possible, even if it requires much effort. See id. at 174-76. He explains:
All actions committed in ignorance are not involuntary, and ignorance itself is not always
a passive state. Central to the mission of a moral life is an informed life, one of the moral
obligations being that of knowing one’s powers and potentials for bringing about morally
weighty outcomes. One who has murdered his parents is not likely to earn sympathy as
an orphan, and one who has stubbornly preserved ignorance - - preserved it as a possibly
useful future excuse - - bears the same responsibility for the damage this ignorance leads
to, and the responsibility for putting or keeping oneself in a state likely to have just these
consequences.
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2. Folk Subconsciousness and the Law of Evidence
a. Limited Relevance
This notion of limited responsibility for the workings of our subconscious mind has
implications for the law of criminal case evidence as well. Except in the extreme cases
mentioned above - - insanity, diminished capacity, and sometimes syndromes arising from
severe trauma - - many courts view evidence of the subconscious thoughts and feelings of the
alleged criminal as of limited, if any, relevance. Certainly courts will not entertain evidence
of subconscious thoughts to establish the mental state element of a crime, though they
sometimes accept evidence offered by the defense of subconscious influence on the conscious
mind as exculpating.83
Even in the rare latter cases, however, the defense evidence is widely derided as
supporting “abuse excuses.”84 Evidence concerning such excuses is especially feared because
its relevance turns on arguing that cultural influences can affect individual thoughts and
actions, making the blame for certain crimes a shared one between society and the offender.85
The way in which social forces affect individual behavior is significantly through
subconscious processes; therefore, to permit evidence about such processes is to abandon the
highly individualistic notion of moral blame that underlies our criminal law.86 Contrary to
what the critics of “abuse excuses” claim, however, to acknowledge shared responsibility is
Id. at 174. Robinson goes on to explain that ignorance motivated by indifference, distraction, or self-interest
rather than natural limitations is ultimately worthy of significant moral sanction because the harm that we do is
reasonably foreseeable and therefore controllable were we more caring, focused, and other-directed, yet, in his
view, instances of natural limitation will be few. See id. at 174-75. Robinson’s vision differs significantly from
the general trial court drift toward viewing subconscious and biological forces as limiting autonomous human
choice and thus moral and legal responsibility. See generally STEPHEN KERN, A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
CAUSALITY: SCIENCE, MURDER NOVELS, AND SYSTEMS OF THOUGHTS 243-65 (2004) (tracing murder law’s
evolution of the casual connection between subconscious mental aberrations or “illnesses” and criminal
responsibility for murder)).
83
See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 44, at 10-14, 76-81, 95-102 (reciting examples).
84
See generally ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP OUTS, SOB STORIES, AND EVASIONS
OF RESPONSIBILITY (2000).
85
See Smith supra note 78; Taslitz, Abuse Excuses, supra note 19, at 1068.
86
Cf. Taslitz, Abuse Excuses, supra note 19 (critiquing criminal evidence law’s “atomistic rationalism,” an
individualist approach blind to the socio-political implications of evidentiary doctrine).
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not necessarily, or even usually,to relieve the individual of all responsibility.87 Still, this fear
of the slippery slope toward the chaos of no individual responsibility for criminal activity
whatsoever may contribute to the frequent - - though by no means universal - - judicial stance
that evidence of subconscious thoughts should rarely be seen as of much, if any, relevance in a
criminal case, even if offered to relieve the accused of responsibility.
b. Fears of Unreliable Opinions
The invisibility and apparent inscrutability of the subconscious mind also seem to lead
judges and legislators to be especially wary of the ability of psychotherapists and especially
social scientists to offer reliable opinions about the mental states of criminal defendants in
particular cases. Congress, in reaction to the public furor over the acquittal of John Hinckley
(the attempted murderer of former President Ronald Reagan) on grounds of legal insanity
amended the Federal Rules of Evidence to prohibit expert opinions on the “ultimate issue” of
an alleged offender’s mental state at the time of the crime.88 Outside traditional mental state
experts like those testifying in support of insanity defenses, many criminal courts have
excluded from the jury’s hearing much psychological testimonybecause it is seen as
insufficiently reliable to meet the admissibility standards of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.89 Some academics and jurists have waged a
war on the use of even traditional expert psychological testimony in insanity cases, arguing
that any social science not relying upon the experimental method, or on sound, traditional
statistical methods, or on their analogues, is not sufficiently trustworthy to survive judicial
scrutiny.90

87

Compare WILSON, supra note 76 (arguing abuse excuses undermine individual responsibility), with Smith,
supra note 78 (arguing such excuses promote shared responsibilities).
88
See FED. R. EVID. 704(b) advisory committee's notes; 21 AM. JUR. 2d CRIMINAL LAW § 52.
89
SEE FED R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 113 S. CT. 2786 (1993).
90
See David Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and
Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989); Smith, supra note 78, at 443-44 (describing the prevailing judicial attitude:
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The courts and many commentators are especially fearful of the opinions of interpretive
social scientists- - those who offer fine-grained descriptions of events and informed
speculation about the subconscious meaning that they hold for the participants.91 Clinical
psychologists use interpretive methods to treat patients and therefore may face a similar
judicial skepticism.92 The courts’ skepticism seems to stem from beliefs that interpretations
are in the jury’s realm and something that cannot be aided by so-called “experts” who are not
even using the tried-and-true scientific methods of controlled experimentation and careful
statistical analysis.93
There is an interesting judicial and academic blindness about the nature of “mental states”
as defined by the law that may help to explain this judicial distrust of interpretive social
science. The folk model of the mind embraced by the judiciary apparently privileges the
conscious mind as the true, autonomous self because the conscious mind thinks primarily in
words.94 Words permit the gathering, storage, and recollection of data about the outside
world; the description and analysis of the data; and a weighing of its strengths, weaknesses,
and plausible meanings. Words enable anticipating and refuting arguments on various sides of

“Allowing a social scientist to testify in a criminal case is worse than allowing a mental health professional to
testify; in the judge’s view, at least mental health professionals draw on their own experience with patients.”).
I am obviously not arguing that courts never admit clinical psychological testimony or social science
evidence. They sometimes do. My argument instead is that they are too often unduly skeptical about such
evidence or mis-analyze its value to the jury based upon judicial confusion about the nature and normative
significance of the conscious and subconscious minds and their inter-relationship.
91
See Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not to Junk?, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1 (1998); Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence: Foundations, 5
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Taslitz, Feminist Approach]. For a book-length defense of using
interpretive social science in court to understand the minds of the participants, see CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN,
PROVING THE UNPROVABLE (forthcoming Oxford University Press 2006) [hereinafter SLOBOGIN, THE
UNPROVABLE].
92
See Richard Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal
Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427 (1980).
93
See Slobogin, supra note 91; Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 44, at 91-94.
94
See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 91, at 1-15 (on evidence law’s implicit understanding of conscious
thought as “self-conversation”); THOMAS SZASZ, THE MEANING OF MIND: LANGUAGE, MORALITY, AND
NEUROSCIENCE (1996) (defending conscious thought more generally as an internal conversation); SLOBOGIN,
THE UNPROVABLE, supra note 91, at 121-24.
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a question. In short, words enable “deliberation.”95 Only the conscious mind deliberates in
this linguistic sense; furthermore, because the conscious mind thinks in words, it is
understandable in a way that the non-linguistic subconscious mind is not. Too much inference
and interpretation is involved in mining the subconscious relative to the conscious mind, thus
too much “guessing,” even by experts. Underlying this whole vision is the idea that there are
“true” mental states “out there” to be discovered by juries rather than partly created by them.
There are several complications flowing from this linguistic notion of mind. One
complication is thateven if conscious thoughts are indeed silent words, internal conversations,
they are no more directly accessible to observers’ minds than are subconscious thoughts. Both
conscious and subconscious thoughts and feelings must usually be inferred from behavior,
sometimes including the words spoken by the alleged offender - - but even these spoken words
rarely directly reveal what their author is thinking.96
Second, words necessarily require interpretations, both by their speakers and by listeners.
If a person’s heart is beating quickly and his hands are sweaty, he must make a judgment
based on the context, his life experience, and his self-understanding whether his physiological
reactions reflect fear or love, eager anticipation or foreboding. That judgment will involve
some internal conversation, however brief, thathe must again interpret.97 Our recognition that
people can be self-deluded, however, suggests that we believe that our own internal
assessments can be wrong. But in what sense can the speaker’s silent reflection on his own
mood and motives be wrong? The answer: if we, as observers, interpret his own internal
conversations differently than he does, reflecting a different reality, he may be mistaken. This
error will exist even if we believe thathis later -expressed statement of what was his mental
95

See SZASZ, supra note 94 (noting value of internal conversations); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL
LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 29 (2001).
96
See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 91, at 23-25.
97
See id. at 23-25; Andrew E. Taslitz, Race and Two Concepts of the Emotions in Date Rape, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S
L.J. 3, 9-13 (2000) [hereinafter Taslitz, Two Concepts].
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state at the time of the crime was sincere, and even if we ignore the risks that his memory has
faded or has become unwittingly biased in his favor with the passage of time - - risks that
heighten the chances of his self-reports being flawed.98 Perhaps tapping into another’s
subconscious thoughts is a more challenging task than mining his conscious ones, buteither
task requires interpretation. Interpretation – in the sense of meaning-creation - - is a different
process from laboratory experimentation and cannot be avoided in the determination of
“mental states” that is required by the criminal law. The currently prevalent hostility toward
interpretive social science experts in the criminal courtroom, if based solely on a judicial
distaste for “interpretation,” cannot be justified.99
c. The Subconscious As Frightening
The folk wisdom also assumes a conscious mind guided by a rigid concept of rationality as
constrained by a certain set of logical rules.100 Courts, juries, and lawyers openly recognize
that humans are flawed and can often be irrational.101 But the subconscious mind is viewed as
far less capable of rationality, perhaps even actively capable only of irrationality, relative to
the conscious mind.102 This lack of rational capacity envisions the subconscious as itself
frightening, dangerous, and beyond real comprehension, a “dybbuk” (in Jewish lore) or demon
(in Christian lore) co-habiting with our soul.103 This fear of the subconscious may further
contribute to the judicial distrust of much social science evidence despite the logic of folk
wisdom’s own world view not dictating such an outcome.
d. Witnesses, Jurors, and Aversion to Abstraction
98

Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 91, at 23-27 (mental state interpretation is a communal activity);
Taslitz, Willfully Blinded, supra note 63.
99
See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 91, at 65-69 (rebutting prevailing suspicion of interpretive social
science).
100
See KEITH E. STANOVICH, THE ROBOT’S REBELLION: FINDING MEANING IN THE AGE OF DARWIN 149-69
(Press 2004).
101
Any well-known trial tactics book repeatedly makes this point, if not necessarily using the same language.
(See, e.g., THOMAS MAUET, FUNDAMENTAL TRIAL TECHNIQUES (2d ed. 2000).
102
See TALLIS, supra note 65, at 11-12, 68.
103
See HOWARD SCHWARTZ, TREE OF SOULS: THE MYTHOLOGY OF JUDAISM 169, 228-30, 383 (2004).
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(i) Privileging the Conscious and the Concrete
The folk concept of the mind affects evidence law in other ways having little to do directly
with the state of mind of the criminal offender. Judges are apt to be equally reluctant to
explore the subconscious minds of witnesses and jurors. For example, when I was a
prosecutor, I repeatedly had the experience of a judge’s turning to a potential juror who had
just admitted to a series of club memberships, social activities, and political commitments
suggesting that the juror might be biased against the state’s case. The judge in each instance
next asked the potential juror a single question: “But can you still be fair?” If the juror
answered “yes,” the judge rejected my request to strike the juror “for cause,” that is, on the
ground that his ability to be fair was suspect. That ruling in turn forced me to exercise my
limited number of peremptory challenges (challenges for no stated reason), if I had any left.
Jury selection is at best more art than science.104 Nevertheless, the judge’s question wrongly
assumes that a juror can and does consciously understand the impact of his perhapssubconscious biases on his ability to keep an open mind.
For similar reasons, courts are reluctant to permit expert testimony to educate the jurors
ultimately empanelled about their likely biases and how to avoid them. A significant body of
research reveals that jurors may embrace racial or gender biases of which they are unaware,
and the laws of chance suggest that at least some such subconsciously-biased jurors are likely
to sit on any individual jury.105 The research also reveals that explaining the existence of these
potential biases does little to combat them. However, further explaining to jurors the
psychological processes by which these biases remain out of our awareness and resistant to
change can reduce their influence.106 Yet use of such jury-reasoning-process experts is not

104

See e.g., NEIL KRESSEL & DORIT KRESSEL, STACK AND SWAY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF JURY CONSULTING
(2001).
105
See e.g., TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 21, at 37-43, 58-63 (1999) .
106
See id. at 131-33.
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widely accepted.107 Moreover, some evidence proffered may have no relevance other than to
disprove or free jurors from a likely pre-existing bias in their thinking. For example, an expert
on gender biases held by jurors might be relevant only on the assumption that at least some
jurors will be gripped by such bias in a way that interferes with their ability to render
judgment fairly. But absent evidence of a particular juror’s bias - - which would probably
result in excusing that juror - - judges are reluctant to see displacing presumed bias as worth
the time and trouble of calling an expert or even as logically relevant to the case.108
This last point reflects a trial judge bias toward the particular and concrete over the
general.109 Often this bias is essential to a fair trial.110 But sometimes, as when the statistical
likelihood of a biased person sitting on the jury is high, generalization is essential to justice.
To take an extreme example, the generalization that a Ku Klux Klan member cannot be fair to
an African-American litigant and thus should not serve on a jury sitting at the latter’s trial is
probably a very safe and wise bet. There is an interesting judicial doublethink involved. On
the one hand, many courts fear concrete expert examination of a specific individual’s
subconscious mind as unduly “interpretive.” On the other hand, they disfavor social science
generalizations about the subconscious mind. Catch 22.
(ii) Fear of Empathy
Judges are also reluctant to build empathy between jurors and the accused. “Empathy”
does not mean compassion for the accused’s situation or approval of his actions. “Empathy”
here just means understanding the situation of another whose experience may be very different
from your own - - an understanding necessary to fair judgment.111 One illustration is the
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“race-switching instruction.” With this instruction, jurors sitting on a case in which an
African-American father is charged with killing his teenage daughter’s white rapists might be
asked to “switch” the races of the respective parties in the jurors’ own minds before sitting in
judgment.112 Although at least one court has used such an instruction, few others have
followed that court’s empathy-building example.113
(iii) Fictional Faith in Limiting Instructions
Trial courts also often ignore research showing that “limiting instructions” have little
impact on jurors.114 Evidence might be admissible for one purpose but not another. Courts
too readily assume that they can admit such evidence but successfully instruct jurors to use it
only for the good purpose but not the bad one.115 The reality is that, try as they might, jurors
cannot really pull off this trick. They will probably subconsciously use the evidence for the
prohibited purpose, though they may also do so consciously. There may sometimes be good
reason to admit even objectionable evidence, but “curing” unfair prejudice by limiting
instructions is not such a reason.116
(iv) Approach-Avoidance About the Narrative Nature of Reality
Similarly, trial judges and lawyers are well aware that jurors reason by crafting narratives
rather than by deductive logic.117 The narratives that make sense to us are learned in part from
the culture in which we live. Trial lawyers craft their trial strategy to appeal to such
narratives.118 The judiciary nevertheless generally rejects efforts to relieve jurors from the
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grip of biased or inaccurate cultural tales, although some progress has recently been made on
this front.119
(v) Undue Faith in Uninformed Lay Judgment
The judiciary is additionally too willing to place faith in the judgment of uninformed
laypersons about matters on which folk wisdom assumes lay competency. Perhaps the most
notorious example is eyewitness testimony.
Subconscious factors affect the accuracy of witness testimony. Thus much empirical data
demonstrates that eyewitnesses making confident identifications of a wrongdoer may be
mistaken because of influences thoroughly outside the witness’s conscious awareness.120 A
witness might focus on an assailant’s weapon more than his face, have trouble distinguishing
among the facial features of persons of a different race from the witness’s, or increase the
certainty of his identification because an officer tells him that he “picked the right guy” in a
lineup.121 The witness is consciously aware of only one thing: he is certain that the accused
did the crime. The exoneration of numerous convicted men based on later DNA evidence has
shown just how wrong such witnesses can be.122 Such exonerations have convinced some
courts therefore to permit testimony on the general psychological and social forces that can
lead to witness error.123 But most continue to resist such a journey into the subconscious
mind, declaring such testimony to cover matters well within the ordinary experience of lay
people, thus not requiring expert guidance - - a position hard to defend if the subconscious of
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even a perfectly mentally healthy, ordinary person can have a substantial impact on the
conscious mind.124
The combination of these aspects of the judicial folk model of the subconscious may thus
go a long way toward explaining the particular judicial resistance to learning from language
and the law researchers in the emotionally strident and politically charged environment of the
date rape trial. How would an alternative legal vision of the subconscious - - a scientifically
informed one - - be different? It is to that question that I now turn.
B. The Scientific Subconscious
Empirical data on the nature of the subconscious mind paints a picture both different from,
and similar to, the folk image. Here, I stress the differences but touch upon the similarities.
1. The Conscious to Subconscious Mind Is More A Spectrum Than A Dichotomy
One critical difference between the folk and the scientific subconscious is that the latter
rejects a sharp dichotomy between the conscious and subconscious minds. As law professor
Deborah W. Denno succinctly put it, “[M]odern neuroscientific research has revealed a fluid
and dynamic relationship between conscious and unconscious processes….[H]uman behavior
is not always conscious or voluntary in the ‘either/or’ way….Rather, consciousness manifests
itself in degrees that represent varying levels of awareness.”125 Various researchers and
philosophers might use different labels and draw the lines in different places, but nearly all
agree that there is a continuum from the “purely” subconscious to full awareness.126
Philosopher John Searle’s approach is illustrative. Searle identifies four stages below full
conscious awareness. The “preconscious” consists of information that is not currently in our
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consciousness but can readily be made so.127 Thus, a historian at a cocktail party might be
talking about the latest science fiction movie without once consciously thinking about
Abraham Lincoln’s views on the morality of slavery. But, if asked about those views, the
historian can readily talk about them, quickly bringing them into his conscious awareness.128
Some mental structure grants him the capacity to produce this information in his conscious
mind.
The “dynamic” or “repressed” unconscious instead consists of thoughts and feelings that
can in principle be brought into the conscious mind and that affect your behavior and even
your conscious thought, but you nevertheless remain totally unaware of these subconscious
states and may insistently deny their existence.129 Acting under hypnosis that implants a
subconscious desire to obey a certain order or acting out of an unacknowledged hostility
toward your brother are examples of the dynamic unconscious at work.130
The “deep unconscious” in Searle’s scheme consists of those mental processes that cannot
even in principle be brought into consciousness. The rules for acquiring language are, for
example, likely forever beyond our awareness.131 Searle labels a fourth type of brain
phenomena the “nonconscious,” brain operations of which we are unaware but that are more
akin to the operation of bodily organs like the stomach than to thinking, such as commands to
the lungs to breathe.132
One further significant subconscious mental phenomenon ignored by Searle consists of
motivated cognitive biases.133 A variety of biases operate at the subconscious level. These
biases include the “vividness heuristic” - - attending more to vivid than pallid data; the
127
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“availability” heuristic - - relying most heavily in informing our beliefs on the most easily
accessible information; and the “confirmation bias” - - searching more enthusiastically for
data confirming rather than disconfirming our beliefs.134 When these three heuristics are
motivated by self-interest, they constitute self-deception.135 Thus, if information furthers selfinterest, it becomes both more vivid and more salient and is paid far more attention than
information contrary to our needs.136 Moreover, many, perhaps most or all, of our conscious
interpretations of events, as will be explained shortly, begin in the subconscious. These biases
may thus combine to contribute to a positive misinterpretation of events. This skewed
subconscious understanding then enters our consciousness in order to justify our actions to
ourselves.
Philosophy Professor Alfred R. Mele gives this highly relevant example:
Sid is very fond of Roz, a college classmate with whom he often studies.
Wanting it to be true that Roz loves him, he may interpret her refusing to
date him and her reminding him that she has a steady boyfriend as an
effort on her part to “play hard to get” in order to encourage Sid to
continue to pursue her and prove that his love for her approximates hers
for him. As Sid interprets Roz’s behavior, not only does it fail to count
against the hypothesis that she loves him; it is evidence for the truth of that
hypothesis.137
It is a short step from this example to understanding how a man can consciously and
sincerely believe that “no” means “yes” while subconsciously knowing otherwise.138 Simply
put, the rapist lies to himself because, if he did not, he might miss out on deeply, if
unilaterally, desired sex.139
2. The Subconscious Is Relatively Multiple, Automatic, Quick, and Short-Sighted
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There is another sense in which the folk dichotomy between the conscious and
subconscious minds contradicts the scientific conception. The scientific subconscious is not a
single system but rather multiple systems working in parallel. These systems are automatic
(fast, unintentional, uncontrollable in the short- run, relatively effortless), rigid (resistant to
change, especially in the short-run), and concerned with the here-and-now. They are “on-line
pattern detectors,” quickly triggered by particular stimuli and especially sensitive to negative
information.140 These similarities, however, justify treating the different function-specific
systems (or “modules”) that are beyond our awareness as constituting the “subconscious,” to
be distinguished from the “conscious.” Thus there may be a “face recognition module,” an
“emotion perception module,” a “kin-oriented motivation module,” and a “grammar
acquisition module,” but all operate automatically, using rigid heuristics to make quick
decisions.141
Such rigidity results in a cost in accuracy in exchange for the benefits of speed and
simplicity.142 For example, we may jump at the sight of a “snake,” an automatic subconscious
reaction done to save our lives, but our conscious mind later realizes that the snake did not
move and is in fact just a stick. The here-and-now obsession of the subconscious focuses on
problems that need immediate attention by detecting patterns, alerting us to danger, and
spurring goal-directed behavior.143 Better that we jump in fear by mistake than that we
recognize a real snake too late and get bitten.144
But this description is not inconsistent with some subconscious processes being complex,
and some may be less in-the-here-and-now focused than others. Much mathematical problem140
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solving may be subconscious; the subconscious may react to speech even for persons
undergoing surgery under anesthesia; and much creative thinking may have its origins in the
subconscious.145 “Hunches” may often stem initially from subconscious processes,146 as do
much of our choice of words in speaking and writing.147 Emotions, such as disgust at certain
of another’s bodily fluids, not merely thoughts, often have subconscious aspects or origins.148
The subconscious can also filter what will reach consciousness and alter the content of
experience before we become aware of it.149 The distinction between conscious and
subconscious thinking as one based partly on degrees of speed, automaticity, and farsightedness, while useful, is once again relative and interactive.
3. The Conscious Mind Is Relatively Unitary, Slow, Farsighted, and LanguageCentric
The conscious mind is also not strictly unitary,150 reflecting the operation of different
neural areas in the brain and of different levels of brain processing and function, including the
sense of self, the sense of others, the “intention” to act (though such an intention has
subconscious roots), the experience of emotions, and phenomenal qualities or “qualia,” such
as the conscious experience of pain.151 Nevertheless, there is a real sense in which conscious
thought is viewed as more unitary than is subconscious thought, justifying “a language of
executive or central control.”152 Philosophers often scoff at this use of language suggesting a
unitary conscious mind or a “central processor” as involving a “homunculus” or “little person
in the head” because we still need to explain how the mind of that “little person” makes
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decisions and gives “us” orders.153 As cognitive scientist Steven Pinker explains, however,
language connoting a unitary conscious mind captures something important about its nature:
The society of mind is a wonderful metaphor, and I will use it with gusto
when explaining the emotions. But the theory can be taken too far if it
outlaws any [unitary, master] system in the brain charged with giving the
reins or the floor to one of the agents at a time. The agents of the brain
might very well be organized hierarchically into nested subroutines with a
set of master decision rules, a computational demon or agent or goodkind-of-homunculus, sitting at the top of the chain of command. It would
not be a ghost in the machine, just another set of if-then rules or a neural
network that shunts control to the loudest, fastest or strongest agent one
level down.154
The effectively “unitary” conscious mind engages in serial, one-at-a-time, rather than
parallel, processing.155 By focusing on one thing (or, at most, a few things) at a time, the
conscious mind can devote all its energies to a single primary task.156 The conscious mind is
far slower than the subconscious, more sensitive to positive information, and more controlled
(intentional, controllable, effortful), serving as an after-the-fact checker and balancer, for
example, spotting that the “snake” really was just a stick and no longer merits fear.157 The
conscious mind also focuses much more heavily on the long view, engaging in planning,
inference, abstraction, decisonmaking, and cognitive control.158 Conscious thought is, in a
sense, the mind’s software, thus sometimes called “mindware,” operating on top of the older
subconscious hardware.159
This mindware program can plan and deliberate because of its unique responsiveness to
language.160 Language allows otherwise isolated subsystems and memory locations to
communicate with one another. Language means that we can easily install new “mindware”
153
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discovered by others and downloaded into our brain as words. Language also has strong
motivational properties, leading us often to change our conscious priorities in response to
linguistic input, conscious new priorities that may conflict with those of the subconscious.161
Language also enables the conscious mind to effect its tendency toward building coherent
narratives.162 So strong is this need to maintain a coherent life’s tale that the conscious seeks
to explain action in a way that involves the conscious choice of behaviors when they were in
fact largely triggered by the subconscious mind.163 Language also enables hypothetical
reasoning, reasoning involving representing “possible states of the world rather than actual
states of affairs,” playing a role in deduction, decisionmaking, scientific investigation, and the
broader cultural acquisition of knowledge.164
4. The Conscious/Subconscious Mind Relationship Is Bi-Directional
The relationship between the scientific conscious and subconscious is also bi-directional,
in contrast to the unidirectional influence from the subconscious to the conscious mind that is
posited by folk wisdom. This observation means that the conscious can, especially over time,
gain a measure of control over the subconscious, though the latter necessarily continues to
influence the former. Moreover, the subconscious influence on both observable behavior and
conscious thought is part of the routine operation of a healthy mind and is not - - again in
contrast to the folk model - - limited to those suffering from mental pathology.165
a. The Power of the Subconscious and Its Short-Term Limits
Empirical research demonstrates that bodily movements begin in the subconscious well
before we are aware of the “desire” to move.166 Neural activity begins subconsciously but
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must persist for 500 milliseconds before it breaks through to consciousness.167 Conscious
thought thus in fact consists of discontinuous separate events.168 Yet, perhaps because of our
need for a coherent narrative, we report awareness of an event before such awareness was
neurologically possible, referring our memory back in time to create a sense of continuity
rather than choppiness in our mental life.169 Movements that seem to us to be in our conscious
control are therefore initiated by the subconscious.
Our sense of conscious control over our actions is, however, not entirely an illusion, for
we become consciously aware of our impetus to act 150-200 milliseconds before the act
itself.170

This window of time has experimentally been shown to be subject to a conscious

veto.171 There is also much reason to believe that an action begun in the subconscious cannot
move to completion without theaffirmative permission of the conscious mind during this
period.172 Subconscious processes may, however, inform the choices consciously being
made.173 An “impulse” to insult our boss for treating us unfairly may thus, for example, be
squelched upon more careful consideration of our self-interest by our conscious mind.
Although our awareness of our conscious choice may itself begin in the subconscious, the
conscious choice itself likely involves an operation independent of the subconscious mind.174
Although there is less supporting experimental evidence, it is likely that all, or most, other
conscious mental events, not simply those involving bodily movements, begin subconsciously
before any awareness appears.175 Imagination, attitudes, and biases may therefore start at the
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subconscious level.176 That does not mean that we are consciously aware of all our biases and
attitudes or their sources. We are not. But when we attain conscious behavioral expression of
these attitudes, there are likely subconscious roots. The subconscious can therefore often
affect our behavior without our awareness, while our consciousness creates an explanation at
odds with the real motivation for our action. This is one kind of self-deception.177 Our
conscious explanations of our behavior may thus often be unconnected to the real causes, and
this is as true of jurors voting to acquit a rapist (subconscious sexist biases perhaps being at
work) as it is of an academic criticizing a junior colleague’s work as inferior, when
subconsciously he may simply fear the competition.
b. ThePower of the Conscious Mind To Explore and Alter the Subconscious In
the Long Run
Yet this observation does not make our conscious mind the slave of our subconscious, nor
mean that the subconscious is forever beyond our control. As noted earlier, the conscious
mind is better at long-range planning and deliberation, including about whether to engage in
certain acts, even if the subconscious ultimately initiates those acts. Such deliberation will be
inadequate, however, if it is based on incomplete information, such as about the subconscious
workings of our mind, or false information, such as our confabulated explanations of our
behavior.178 Precisely because the subconscious is outside our awareness, gaining complete
and accurate information about its operation to guide conscious judgment may be hard.
Yet it is not impossible. Feelings and attitudes - - as opposed to cognitions - - are the sorts
of subconscious phenomena that can most readily be made available to consciousness.179 In
particular, close attention to how others respond to your behavior is often a better guide to
176
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your real emotions than is your own self-deceiving introspection.180 Because this is so,
attention to how others would likely perceive your own behavior can be a helpful guide to
what is really going on in your head. Consequently, if a man feels subconscious discomfort
about a sexual situation, by choosing to give credence to a woman’s “no”s and to her
struggles, he can get in touch with the sources of his discomfort.181 An accused rapist who
consciously believes that his victim consented may lie to the police about certain details of the
encounter because he understands that those details will not “look good” to others. But this
means that he was capable of asking himself at the time of the alleged crime what others
would have thought about his actions. Had he done so, he could have helped to identify his
own (subconscious) suspicions, using them to avoid the harm of non-consensual sex.182
The conscious mind can also choose to increase the information available to the
subconscious mind, altering its “triggers.” A well-informed subconscious, according to
influential researchers, is likely to make better decisions than an ill-informed one.183 How can
we achieve this goal in the case of rape? A man can choose to go slow, spending more time
with a woman, getting to know her better. He can directly ask her questions about her
thoughts, feelings, and desires, especially when he intends to engage in any sort of physical
intimacy. This need not squelch spontaneity, but it will involve a negotiation, a give and take.
If a woman says “no,” a man can ask again later - - but gently and carefully, lest she perceive
him as unwilling to take no for an answer - - or he can wait until she takes the initiative rather
than his plunging forward as if the word “no” had no meaning.184 A subconscious more
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informed about a woman’s desires will be less likely to delude itself and more able to convey
the truth to the conscious mind, for example, by generating “gut feelings” of discomfort.185
The subconscious mind also monitors, and learns from, our own behavior.186 If you
behave courageously, your subconscious eventually infers that you are indeed courageous.
Your behavior provides new data for the subconscious, and any behavior repeated often
enough to become habitual will also become part of the subconscious.187 Correspondingly,
therefore, if you behave like a man who is sincerely interested in the well-being of his partner,
rather than in only his own narrow self-interest - - even if his current feelings are otherwise - you will become that more sexually attentive man. Given the risk of harm - - namely rape - from a mistake, society has an interest in encouraging such sensitivity.188
Research also suggests thatstudying subconscious processes and biases and why we are
reluctant to recognize their operation and give up their influence on us can indeed sometimes
reduce that influence in individual cases where such influence becomes an obstacle to
promoting desired individual or societal goals.189 Education of certain types can therefore at
least occasionally both reduce the dissonance between our conscious and subconscious
motivations and increase our conscious control over our subconscious minds. Additionally,
awareness of what triggers certain subconscious processes can enable us to manipulate stimuli
to avoid undesirable triggers. Thus a police officer’s tendency to convey subconscious
“minimal cues” to a witness about whom to select as the perpetrator of a crime from a lineup
can be avoided by “double-blind” methods in which neither the officer administering the
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lineup nor the witness know who is the suspect.190 This same principle of designing an
institutional environment that suppresses some subconscious triggers while activating others
can be applied in the courtroom to a wide range of evidence other than eyewitness
identifications.191
5. Recap and Taking Stock
To summarize: The conscious and subconscious minds are on a continuum and routinely
interact in ways that make it hard sharply to separate one from the other. This interaction is
bi-directional so that, while the subconscious can influence conscious thought and behavior,
the reverse is true as well, especially in the long run. Moreover, these bi-directional
influences are as characteristic of the healthy as the unhealthy mind. Furthermore, the
subconscious is not necessarily irrational, but serves different functions than does the
conscious mind, while the latter is not necessarily always “rational” in the sense of being the
best guide to achieving individual and societal goals. Moreover, some subconscious thoughts
can be made accessible to the conscious mind, while other subconscious thoughts can be
consciously altered even without such access. Additionally, institutional environments can
give us a measure of control over our subconscious’s influence on our conscious thoughts and
behavior, even in the short run.
A proper understanding of these observations about the scientific subconscious may have
implications for the substantive criminal law and for the law of evidence that are different
from those suggested by folk conceptions. It is those implications to which this article now
turns.
IV.

Implications
A. The Substantive Criminal Law of Rape
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1. The Robot’s Rebellion
Because our conscious thoughts and seemingly consciously-chosen actions are
generally at least partly rooted in subconscious processes beyond our full awareness, any
effort entirely to divorce moral and criminal responsibility from our subconscious thoughts is
fictional, an artificial distinction ignorant of the teachings of cognitive science.192 Conscious
choice is not so easily and cleanly divorced from subconscious “thoughts” and “feelings.” Of
course, if, as the folk model posits, subconscious influence means subconscious subjugation
of a conscious mind ignorant of its master’s control, then recognizing a broader connection
between the two levels of mind would mean that we have limited, if any, responsibility for
our conscious thoughts and actions. True “deliberate” choice would be an illusion.
But cognitive science’s teachings counsel the very opposite conclusion. Professor
Keith F. Stanovich, holder of the Canada Cognitive Research Chair at the University of
Toronto, describes this state of affairs as the “Robot’s Rebellion.”193 Stanovich concedes that
we often behave like robots, mechanically controlled by our genes and our subconscious
minds (what he calls “TASS.”). But we robots are capable of at least limited “rebellion”
against our masters because of the deliberate power of our conscious or “analytic” mind. Our
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conscious mind can often become aware of subconscious biases, can make normative choices
about their value, and can devise strategies to reduce the effects of those biases deemed
undesirable (more on this in the next section of this article).194 Furthermore, although not
mentioned by Stanovich, the immediately preceding section of this articlesu mmarized other
helpful tactics for altering even subconscious thoughts and processes forever beyond our
conscious awareness, such as repeatedly pushing ourselves to learn more about others with
whom we interact before leaping into decisions about how we will treat them, and behaving
routinely like the person we want to be. Repeatedly kind acts teach our subconscious to be
lessselfish. If other-directedness is something we value, this new subconscious can be the
source of future morally appropriate, rather than condemnable, behaviors. In the long-term,
the subconscious can be as much a force for good as for evil, and neither it nor the conscious
mind are beyond the ability of informed, deliberative choice. The subconscious is relevant to
moral and criminal responsibility but not solely in an exculpatory fashion. The robot can, and
often should, learn to re-program itself.
2. Proof Problems and Their Solution
Yet there are complications. I have argued above that the claimed easier access to
conscious than subconscious thoughts may be overstated because both inquiries involve
interpretive judgments. To say that something is “interpretive” does not mean that anything
goes. Some interpretations are based on more evidence, clearer data, and more persuasive
reasoning than others.195 Nevertheless, it is harder to judge the quality of some interpretive
decisions than others. In particular, interpreting the subconscious mind’s content at a single
moment in time is even more difficult than doing so for the conscious mind precisely because
even the actor being judged - - here, the criminal suspect - - is unaware of much that is
194
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happening in his subconscious. Proof problems may preclude making confident judgments
about the contents of the subconscious mind beyond what is revealed via conscious thought
and action.
But the law can get around this proof problem by choosing an “objective” mental state
- - a sort of negligence standard - - to define the crime of rape. Yet the crafting of this
standard can take into account much of what we know about the subconscious workings of the
male mind, illustratively the common mechanisms by which men deceive themselves about
women’s sexual desires. The law should discourage men from being self-deceivers.196 More
than this, it should encourage men to make reasonable communicative efforts to determine a
woman’s desires. Such a standard would not be one of strict liability. A man who made
reasonable efforts to find out whether a woman had consented would not be criminally
responsible if he nevertheless turned out to be wrong. “Reasonable” communicative efforts,
however, would be judged as those made by a non-self-deceiving male under the
circumstances.197
There are practical ways to make this sort of standard real at trial - - as I and others
have discussed at length elsewhere.198 The narrow points to be made here, however, are
these: (1) that, if we believe that most male date rapists are also self-deceivers, it is legitimate
to craft a legal standard that takes into account the problem of subconscious and semiconscious self-deception as a source of criminal liability; (2) that, if we further believe that
self-deceivers are more morally reprehensible than other sorts of negligent actors - - perhaps
because self-deceivers have some level of actual awareness of their wrong, are a type of
hypocrite, are inauthentic persons, and lie to themselves and to others- - then we are justified
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in imposing harsher penalties on them than is ordinarily true for crimes of negligence; and (3)
that, because the “reasonable” communicative efforts test is an objective one, it avoids the
proof problem of determining an individual actor’s subconscious mental state on a particular
occasion.199 Continuing an unfair practice in the face of factually refuting evidence is in itself
blameworthy, a grievous moral wrong.200 Doing so to serve one’s self-interest is worse
still.201
3. The Subconscious and Democratic Deliberation
My suggested standard of course reflects a number of contestable normative
judgments. More importantly, however, is that my approach presupposes that both
individuals and collectivities are capable of reasoned deliberation about such judgments and
capable of acting upon them. It rejects the folk vision of the subconscious as compromising
deliberative capacities. Such presuppositions of individual and societal deliberative capacities
are essential to the legitimacy of a democratic republic of free and equal citizens. As
Professor Klaus Günther of Frankfurt University explains:
[D]emocracy presupposes responsible citizens: citizens who attribute
responsibility to one another as participants in public deliberation. If
public deliberation is the most important feature of democratic legislation,
then each citizen has to be conceived of as a person who is able to
deliberate on the validity of legal norms. This requires the ability to give
and accept reasons, as well as the ability to control his or her will
according to the reasons he or she accepts.202
Professor Günther continues:
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The deliberative concept of a person that informs the notion of a
citizen now finds its mirror image in the legal person as the addressee of
norms. Citizens who treat one another as responsible authors of their legal
norms also have to treat one another as being responsible for obeying their
norms. It would not make sense to claim to be a responsible participant in
public deliberation, but to plead ignorance when it comes to obeying the
law in a concrete situation.203
This democratic concept of the deliberative self is inconsistent with some exculpatory
arguments made on behalf of rape defendants, drawing on the alleged lessons of forensic
linguistics. Men are sometimes portrayed as literally incapable of understanding “women’s
language,” lacking the capacity to “get” all but the clearest, loudest, and most aggressive
female protests.204 Misunderstandings are worsened by the admission of many women that
“no” does not always mean “no.”205 When the men make a mistake, they are not at fault.
Similar claims are made regarding misunderstandings about “body language.” Even worse,
however, is that women are often portrayed as more cognitively capable than men, thus able to
be aware of men’s incapacities and thus morally responsible for the consequences of not
clearing up any misunderstanding.206
This line of argument degrades the image of men as equal citizens with mature
deliberative capacities. In a democratic republic, respect for men requires treating them as if
they are as capable of understanding and deliberating about sexual choices as are women.
Moreover, such deliberation crosses the line from being about a private matter to becoming a
public matter when the risk of non-consensual sexual intercourse - - of rape - - is involved, for
crimes by definition involve an injury to the “public” good.207 This degradation of men also
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belies the teachings of science. Men are fully capable of understanding women’s language
and behavior if they commit themselves to doing so.208 Indeed, the degree to which an
individual speaks “women’s” language or otherwise adopts a more deferential speaking style
is likely affected as much by situational factors, such as relative perceived social status and
power imbalances, as by anything else.209 Thus men may show features of “women’s”
language in many situations, revealing that men already know how to speak and understand a
variety of linguistic styles, even if many of them often more easily engage in one style than
another.210
4. “Memes” and Male Responsibility
The theory of “memes” might be interpreted as still supporting compromised visions
of male moral culpability. The “meme” concept is that ideas spread like viruses, looking for
“hosts” within which to set up residence, even when the memes may threaten the hosts’
physical or mental health.211 The memes are interested more in their own spread and survival
than that of the host’s, and the host may prove receptive to them for a variety of reasons other
than the host’s self-interest.212 Memes seem to suggest that we are slaves to ideas rather than
their authors. In the current context of this article, men may thus be seen as “slaves” to
patriarchy, thus not fully responsible for their coercive sexual behavior. This understanding of
memes contradicts the democratic presupposition of real deliberative individual capacity.
Memes acquired early in life, before any of us have full reflective capacities, arguably pose a
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particular danger, having long “avoided consciously selective tests of their usefulness.”213
Philosopher Robert Nozick utters a similar caution:
Mostly we tend - - I do too - - to live on automatic pilot, following through
the views of ourselves and the aims we acquired early with only minor
adjustments. No doubt there is some benefit - - a gain in ambition or
efficiency - - in somewhat unthinkingly pursuing early aims in their
relatively unmodified form, but there is a loss too, when we are directed
through life by the not fully mature picture of the world we formed in
adolescence or young adulthood….This situation is (to say the least)
unseemly - - would you design an intelligent species so continuously
shaped by its childhood, one whose emotions had no half-life and where
statutes of limitations could be invoked only with great difficulty?214
Nozick’s caution is not one, however, about the human incapacity to resist earlyacquired memes but rather about the human reluctance - - perhaps because of simple laziness - to do so. Professor Stanovich explains that all memes are, in the long run, subject to just as
much deliberation and change as is much of our subconscious, for memes take residence in the
conscious or subconscious minds or both.215 Furthermore, notes Stanovich, the growing
knowledge of how memes gain their grip on us and that information’s ready accessibility to
those who care to look makes it even easier to resist their hold.216
A few final caveats. I am not in this brief space trying to defend “free will” as an
empirical reality. The criminal justice system assumes that such free will exists and is
unlikely to dispose of that assumption any time soon.217 If free will exists, I argue, then the
mere existence of the subconscious mind should not be understood as impairing that freedom
in the long run. The subconscious, to the contrary, must be seen as an essential part of the
self, awareness of its operation and appeal to its mechanisms as being essential both to making
informed, autonomous choices and to crafting institutions that promote such choices.
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Additionally, attributing responsibility based upon the assumption of an informed,
autonomous choosing capacity - - that is, of free will - - is essential to fostering the values and
institutional processes essential to a democratic society of free and equal citizens. The folk
conception of the subconscious is thus both empirically wrong and inconsistent with the best
vision of the nature of the “person” in a free society. The folk conception thus has pernicious
effects on the criminal justice system, including rape trials, effects compounded by the courts’
resistance to more empirically accurate and normatively desirable understandings of the
conscious and subconscious minds that underlie many of the teachings of forensic linguistics.
B. Evidentiary Implications
1. The Power of General Principles
If gauging an individual’s subconscious mental state at a particular point in time is
more art than science, the same cannot be said about the useful generalizations revealed by a
vast array of empirically-grounded research about the subconscious mind. For example, such
research identifies a “fundamental attribution error” made by most human beings. This error
is the tendency of observers to attribute an individual’s behavior more to character than to
situation.218 Moreover, because of the “devil’s horn” and “halo effects,” evidence of a bad or
good character trait may be understood as marking an entire person’s personality as bad or
good.219 Furthermore, most observers are willing to make quick judgments about another’s
personality based on very little evidence.220 Accordingly, someone learning of another’s
violent act may be quickly likely to conclude that he is generally a violent person, therefore
likely to commit other violent acts, when there might have been some unusual situational
factor that prompted an otherwise peaceful man to turn to a single instance of violence.221
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These cognitive tendencies suggest that there is great wisdom in the American rule generally
excluding from trials evidence of a person’s character trait offered to prove that he committed
the particular criminal act or civil wrong now alleged.222
In other instances, however, research about the nature of the subconscious mind may
counsel not exclusion, but rather inclusion, of evidence. Specifically, it can be helpful to
educate jurors about psychological principles of which they would otherwise likely be
unaware. Knowing, for example, that stress can make an eyewitness identification of a
criminal assailant less trustworthy rather than “focusing the witness’s mind” or that certain
common non-violent interrogation techniques can prompt the innocent to confess - conclusions contrary to prevailing cultural beliefs - - can aid a jury in deciding whether it is
persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that a criminal defendant committed the alleged
crime.223 Research suggests that such testimony can significantly improve the quality of juror
decisionmaking.224 The power of the law to use social science to generalize can therefore aid
in crafting evidence rules - - like the character and expert evidence rules just discussed - - in
much the same way as generalization aided the substantive criminal law.
2. Context
Recognizing that jurors, unaided, will generally not be aware of their own
subconscious biases further counsels judicial receptivity to jury education about social
science. The common judicial assumptions that a juror who says he can be fair can indeed be
fair or that indicators of a juror’s potential bias will be obvious or within the juror’s conscious
awareness are just wrong. “Scientific” jury selection techniques, on the other hand, have not
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generally been proven to be of much value either.225 The consequence is that it is fair to
assume that in most cases at least some members of a jury will suffer subconscious biases that
so skew their judgment that they cannot be fair and impartial factfinders. Correcting
misconceptions about human behavior through expert testimony can sometimes help. Deeply
engrained biases may require more aggressive expert solutions, that is, experts whose main
function is to explain to jurors what biases they are likely to hold, why, and why they are
resistant to escaping the resulting pernicious effects despite their best intentions, as I explained
earlier in this article.
The problem here is one of the human “tendency to contextualize a problem with as
much prior knowledge as is easily accessible, even when the problem is formal….”226 The
law, by contrast, often requires “radical decontextualization…put[ting] a premium on
detaching prior belief and world knowledge from the process of evidence evaluation.”227
Jurors are repeatedly told to decide only based upon the evidence before them at trial, yet they
frequently fill in gaps needed to create a coherent tale with supposed evidence never
offered.228 Their impetus is to craft tales matching those familiar to them from their own life
experience.229 Likewise, they follow rules about what sorts of stories “make sense” that they
absorb from their local cultures.230
Jurors’ resistance to the radical decontextualization of the law is often desirable. It is
one of the ways that jurors can serve as a check on abusive, unjust, or excessively bureaucratic
exercises of government power.231 To take one obvious example, the law of self-defense
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generally permits the use of “deadly force” only if the defender actually and reasonably
believes that he or she is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury from an
attacker.232 A purely formalistic view of the law - - a view long embraced by American courts
- - would make this judgment based on a narrow time frame (the moment of the attack),
treating all participants as fictionally the same, their individual life stories being irrelevant to
the formal legal question whether the suspects acted in self-defense.233 Likewise, the social
forces that might explain the defender’s actions and give them meaning would be ignored. In
such a world, a wife suffering a decade’s worth of physical and psychological abuse at her
husband’s hands, who killed him while he was napping, would be denied an acquittal on
grounds of self-defense.234 A jury seeing signs of such abuse and recognizing that the woman
might in fact be aware of behaviors by her husband that her experience taught her meant he
would mount a particularly vicious attack when heawaken ed - - which might happen at any
second - - might instead conclude that the wife did reasonably fear imminent serious bodily
injury if she did nothing.235 Such re-contextualization would, at least in the view of many
feminist thinkers, achieve real justice.236
One problem, of course, is that if the trial judge bars all evidence suggestive of a
history of spousal abuse, re-contextualization along these lines might never even occur to the
jurors. Perhaps equally worrisome, even were evidence of abuse admitted, jurors might lack
knowledge of the social and psychological dynamics of spousal abuse or, worse, harbor
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affirmative misconceptions of those dynamics.237 Active efforts to read cold legal rules in as
contextual a fashion as their text permits and to enliven trials with the relevant personal and
social background arising from real human relationships can thus help to combat an arid legal
system separated too far from social complexities.238 Social science experts, such as those on
the fate of battered women, can help to combat unsubstantiated stereotyping and help in
jurors’ bringing coherent meaning to seemingly chaotic and conflicting evidence.239
Yet other times the better choice is de-contextualization, and, for this task too, experts
may be needed to achieve that goal. Even the most enlightened jurors, who are firmly
ideologically opposed to racial or gender discrimination, may be unaware that their own
subconscious processes are promoting preciselythe unequal treatment thatthey so abhor. This
may be true in the face of their absolute insistence to the contrary. Law professor Jody
Armour summarizes the research findings on this subject:
If cues of group membership such as race serve to prime trait categories
such as hostility, people will systematically view behaviors by members of
certain racial groups (e.g., Blacks) as more menacing than the same
behaviors by members of other racial groups (e.g., Whites). Thus Whites
will interpret the same ambiguous shove as hostile or violent when an
actor is Black, and as “playing around” or “dramatizing” when the actor is
White. Category accessibility best explains this differential perception of
violence as a function of the protagonist’s race: the presence of the Black
actor primed the stereotype thatassociates Blacks with violence; the
violent-behavior category was more accessible when interpreting
behavioral information about Blacks than Whites. These findings have
been replicated in studies of school children. Both Black and White
children rated ambiguously aggressive behaviors (e.g., bumping in the
hallway) of Black actors as being more mean or threatening than that of
White actors.240
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Although there is some ambiguity on the point, Armour argues that, for many people,
this racial-hostility trigger happens automatically, outside conscious awareness, even for
subjects who have sincerely renounced racial prejudice.241 Such automatic processes “operate
independently of conscious decisions to break with old patterns of response and adopt new
ones.”242 Therefore, explains Armour, “attitudes and beliefs can change without a
corresponding change in established habits, resulting in a conflict between currently endorsed
responses and old habitual habits.”243 The Black stereotype can be particularly resistant to
change because it takes root when we are children, too young to resist its lure. Moreover, the
mass media and everyday social interactions reinforce the stereotype.244
To say that such stereotypes are resistant to change does not mean that the resistance
cannot be overcome. Sometimes resistance is not futile. In particular, strategies designed to
prod fact finders consciously to monitor their responses to avoid unconscious stereotyping can
succeed.245 Research again suggests that experts can be helpful in this area, particularly
experts who educate jurors not just about their preconceptions but why they hold on to them:
[Social] myths continue to operate subconsciously. Discrimination is a
habit that is hard to break. But if subjects who view a prejudiced belief as
wrong are told how it may nevertheless affect their judgments, they are
better able to monitor and thereby reduce the belief’s impact. Making
unconscious biases conscious biases does seem to help jurors to evaluate
victim testimony more fairly.246
3. Normative Choices
Note that many of these evidentiary choices, like the substantive criminal law choices,
turn on explicitly normative judgments. Whether to “recontextualize” a self-defense claim
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with an understanding of the nature of spousal abuse or to “decontextualize” race from an
assault trial turns both on empirical and value-based judgments. Illustratively, the false but
widespread belief that black males are more dangerous than white males such that the race of
victim and offender should be relevant in a rape trial can in theory be empirically tested.247
Yet even if it were shown to be true that black males were on average more violent than white
males, not all generalizations are morally equivalent. To permit a jury to decide that because
many black males are violent, this black male must have been violent in this caseis to violate
principles of individualized justice fundamental to the modern Anglo-American legal system
as well as the to constitutional mandate of equal protection.248
The self-defense judgment becomes normative in another way too: the reasonableness
of the defender’s beliefs, as noted earlier, matters separate and apart from their honesty and
accuracy. A plausible, albeit today morally offensive, argument might be made that a white
“victim” was justified in believing that she faced an imminent assault partly because the black
race of her apparent attacker merited fear of violence.249 Accordingly, she struck first. Even
if her apparent assailant was in fact no danger at all, the argument would be that cultural
mores and life experience entitled the white defender to her mistake.250
Certainly, many all-white jurors in the 1950s South might have found such an
argument perfectly sensible.251 Although such overt appeals to the reasonableness of
perceptions of racial danger may be the exception rather than the rule, they may still covertly
influence modern verdicts based on subconscious value judgments.252 Better to bring those
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judgments into the open and to confront some jurors with their unwitting hypocrisy - - their
conscious embrace of equal justice but subconscious and behavioral embrace of its opposite.
More importantly, in areas other than race, there is today less social agreement about what is
right, yet jurors are often charged with making “reasonableness” judgments, judgments that
are fundamentally normative, in these areas.253 Because evidence law, like the substantive
criminal law, thus inevitably involves the exercise of value judgments, democratic principles
come into play.
4. Democracy and Institutional Design
These principles can play out in institutional design. Thus the size and composition of
juries can alter verdict outcomes and certainly alter the range of arguments made and views
exchanged in the courtroom.254 The jury is fundamentally a political institution. It enables
ordinary persons to restrain and monitor government power and gives the people a voice in
shaping the meaning of legal justice as it is applied in individual cases.255 If careful, wellinformed deliberation is the hallmark aspiration of democratic institutions, then juries too must
be fully informed, considering diverse perspectives, and hearing from many salient social
groups.256 It is for reasons like these that the high Court has banned racial discrimination in
jury selection, and the American Bar Association has sought to reverse the trend towards
smaller and non-unanimous juries.257 Empirical research, of course, is partly responsible for
the ABA’s understanding that jury size alters outcomes, but a particular understanding of
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political morality led that prestigious association to bemoan that finding and seek to reverse its
effects.258
Forensic linguistics offers the same evidentiary benefits in both institutional design and
expert evidence as does all valid social science. Awareness of the ways in which adversarial
procedures can predispose jurors – drawing on both skewed cultural narratives and a negative
reaction to perceived “women’s language” and speaking styles - - can and should spark
discussion about constitutional ways to moderate the adversary system’s worst features in rape
cases. Forensic linguistic experts can improve the quality of jury decisionmaking by testifying
about the ways that perceived ways of speaking can skew credibility judgments without the
jurors’ awareness and why they might find it hard to overcome such biases. By making jurors
aware of the role of situational factors, including gender and power disparities in affecting
credibility judgments, juries can be encouraged to confront the importance of those disparities
as an unavoidable feature of any fair and open deliberative process about whether there was a
“rape,” a process involving such overtly normative judgments as whether the woman
“consented” and whether the man’s belief in consent was “reasonable.”259 Awareness of these
relevant social processes can also contribute, when combined with knowledge in other fields,
to crafting evidence rules that might ameliorate or aggravate power disparities, such as by
permitting one form of character evidence - - prior acts of sexual violence - - against an
accused while prohibiting another form of character evidence - - prior consensual sex acts by
the victim.260 More informed legislative debate, judicial evidentiary craftsmanship, and jury
deliberation simultaneously can improve the accuracy of jury judgments on simple facts like
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who hit whom and the democratic pedigree of judgments on normative facts like whether the
man acted reasonably.261
V. Conclusion
Courts’ resistance to the evidentiary lessons of forensic linguistics for date rape cases
has served in this article as a jumping off point for discussing a broader phenomenon: the
court’s misunderstanding of the scientific subconscious in substantive and evidentiary
criminal law more generally. The courts have embraced a folk idea of the subconscious as
diseased, mysterious, and inscrutable, either depriving the conscious mind of free will (where
the disease gets out of hand) or, more commonly, being irrelevant to criminal liability, which
turns on the control of the rational, independent, conscious mind. The inscrutability of the
subconscious also makes it resistant to exploration, even by experts, though courts will permit
such inquiries in the narrow, extreme circumstances in which the diseased subconscious has
thoroughly infected and overtaken the conscious mind, such as in cases of legal insanity.262
The scientific subconscious paints a very different picture in which the conscious and
subconscious minds are part of a continuum rather than a dichotomy and in which each
portion of the continuum reciprocally influences other portions. Thus the conscious and
subconscious minds are not truly separable. Moreover, there are ways to gain access to
aspects of the subconscious in reasonably reliable ways, but, even where neither the individual
nor experts can do so, each person still has significant control over the content of his
subconscious mind. Such control can be attained by consciously collecting additional
information and consciously altering behavior. What we know and how we act change who we
are, even at the subconscious level. We are, therefore, generally responsible for the workings
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of our entire mind, both that on the surface and the happenings below. These lessons extend
not only to criminal wrongdoers but to the witnesses who would condemn them and the jurors
who would judge them, for our observations, memories, and judgment all turn on a
combination of conscious and subconscious processes.263 Accordingly, the law must not hide
the subconscious, fear it, or flee it. Rather, the law must cautiously take it into account in
designing substantive rules of criminal liability and fair procedures, without being blind to the
difficulties attendant to doing so.
Several corollaries follow from this vision of a criminal justice system infused with the
vision of the scientific subconscious.
First, the courts should in some instances be more receptive to expert testimony about
the workings of the subconscious mind and its influence on conscious thought and behavior.
This article is not the place to offer a detailed evidentiary guide for such testimony, a task that
I and others have undertaken elsewhere.264 What this article does do, however, is to suggest
that there is good reason - - reason rooted in a scientific understanding of the subconscious
mind - - for the courts to be open-minded about such evidentiary schema. This is not a plea
for open-ended admissibility of such testimony. Like all expert testimony, careful judicial
scrutiny is required.265 Sometimes testimony concerning general psychological principles may
suffice. For example, jurors are unlikely to appreciate the circumstances under which
eyewitness identifications can be unreliable or confessions untrustworthy. Ample
experimental and field data are available concerning the subconscious processes relevant to
these inquiries, including data demonstrating the ability of juries properly to weight such
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information in deciding an individual case.266 Ordinary expert evidentiary principles should
favor admissibility of much expert testimony in these areas, and there is no reason for courts
to display unusual skepticism,267
Other times, clinical testimony might be offered about an individual offender’s
character or state of mind, testimony that may examine his subconscious reasoning. Because
accessing the content of the subconscious mind is an even more difficult interpretive task than
is revealing conscious thought, courts may fear particular dangers of charlatanism. Yet,
though a more difficult interpretive task, examining the subconscious is still an interpretive
task that is not substantially different in quality from that involved in exploring the conscious
mind, a job that we assign to laypersons (jurors) every day.268 Experts can focus attention on
evidence of relevant aspects of reality that laypersons might otherwise miss.269 For that focus
to be useful, however, it must result from thorough investigation pursuant to well-tested
procedures. Professor Christopher Slobogin, an internationally renowned expert on evidence
law and psychology, has proposed a four factor test of materiality, probative value,
helpfulness, and prejudicial impact, offering a book-length defense of this approach in a
forthcoming work.270 Slobogin would permit experts passing this test to engage in “informed
speculation” about an offenders’ character or mental state to open up jurors’ minds to
plausible interpretations of offender conduct that would otherwise escape their notice.271 This
article suggests that Slobogin’s carefully reasoned evidentiary framework should receive a
warm reception upon his book’s publication.
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Second, even for those who remain skeptical of the sorts of inquiries Slobogin
endorses, knowledge of subconscious processes can aid in crafting objective standards of
substantive criminal liability. There is an odd seeming paradox at work here: greater
subjectification of mental state inquiries - - ones that account for an offender’s entire mind,
not merely its conscious portion - - can provide increased support for more objective
standards. My main illustration here has been counseling a “reasonable belief in consent”
standard in date rape cases where reasonableness is judged by the standard of the non-selfdeceiving male.272 Self-deception necessarily involves partially to fully subconscious
processes, processes likely common to most date rapists and subject to moral sanction.
Knowledge of these processes and their normative implications allows jurors to subject those
who behave as if those processes are at work to community condemnation.273 A similar
analytical approach to other crimes might lead to a re-thinking of subjective culpability
standards, replacing them with more objective ones that in the broad run of cases better reflect
the moral impetus behind the increasing subjectification of the criminal law.274
Third, understanding the scientific subconscious supports a vision of the human mind
more in tune with democratic theory. Recognizing the existence and moral significance of the
subconscious mind as an essential and healthy part of every human being, one subject to
molding in light of deliberative individual and group choice, holds the whole person
responsible for his actions and related thoughts and emotions. To encourage more informed
individual choice for potential defenders and more realistic, educated group deliberation by
jurors of the totality of the human soul is to embrace the insights of modern democratic theory
with a vengeance.275 This broad democratic vision can lead to legal rules supportive of
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enhanced individual responsibility and improved political deliberation by the organs of the
criminal justice system.
The democratic features of the model of the scientific subconscious should likewise
impose special obligations on the relevant experts to inform the lay public and legal
authorities, particularly the judiciary, about the nature and relevance of subconscious thought
and this insight’s value for criminal justice reform. Returning to the example of forensic
linguists, experts in those areas must work to advance public and judicial education.
Such education requires language researchers to move beyond the comfortable
confines of academic journals and university presses. They must become public intellectuals.
That means learning to replace the too often dry, abstruse style of academic writing with a
more engaging writing style. It means popularizing linguistic concepts in op-eds, trade
paperbacks, and newspaper stories. It means appearing on National Public Radio and even
Oprah. It means lecturing at judicial conferences and bar associations. And it means working
with lawyers to aid in crafting evidentiary motions and strategies and in lobbying legislatures.
Similar movements to aid battered spouses and to reduce the number of innocent persons
convicted have been undertaken with significant success by joint lawyer-social scientist teams
in those areas.276 Language researchers should mount similar efforts. My call, therefore, is
not for researchers to sacrifice their role as scientists in the name of advocacy, but rather to
abandon the elitism of the ivory tower to become educators of the broader public and thus
particularly helpful contributors to the health of American democracy.
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